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Abstract 
 
Process hazard analysis (PHA) teams are responsible for determining and categorizing the 
potential impact of a loss of containment. For streams containing hydrogen sulfide (H₂S), the 
health and safety consequences of a worker being exposed to H₂S are a function of airborne 
concentration in the breathing zone and duration of exposure. PHA teams often do not have the 
technical knowledge to link the known concentration of H₂S in the process stream to an adverse 
health outcome. This paper describes the methodology and the assumptions made in developing 
such guidance. H2S concentration in the stream was correlated to concentration of H2S in the 
breathing zone. Vapor releases used dispersion modeling, while liquid releases required 
additional modeling to determine the amount of H2S liberated from the released liquid. Modeling 
was done on different process streams under a variety of conditions. Concentration in the 
breathing zone was linked to the most probable health and safety outcome by surveying relevant 
literature published by private and government sources. This correlated the stream concentration 
of H2S directly to the consequence categorization used in the PHA. Results were summarized, 




During a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) or during incident investigations, teams need to rank 
the potential adverse health and safety outcomes based on a company’s severity scale. This 
requires multiple steps – first, it needs to be established what the consequence would be; 
secondly, how it would affect any personnel in the area; and finally, how these effects would be 
classified per the company’s risk standard. For hydrogen sulfide (H2S) releases, teams would 
first need to predict the concentration in the area where personnel are located to determine the 
potential exposure and then define the effect on a person. That requires knowledge in dispersion 
modeling and toxicity of H2S. This is typically beyond the skill level of a PHA team, thus 
leaving the team guessing with regards to severity. To achieve comparable risk rankings, it is 
important that the appropriate severity is determined consistently by different teams. 
For risk ranking, the consequence should be based on the most probable worst-case outcome, not 
the worst possible. When consequences are overrated with regards to severity, it takes attention 
and resources away from the truly high severity cases. For H2S, the hazards of exposure are 
emphasized in the safety training for anyone working in a refinery environment and there are 
many well publicized cases of past fatalities. This can lead teams to overestimate the 
consequences of H2S exposure if there are no clear guidelines or data available to help them in 
their evaluation. 
For a qualitative risk analysis, teams can compensate for overstating the severity by understating 
the frequency – based on the experience that the (overstated) consequence has never been 
observed. It does not matter for the overall qualitative risk ranking whether the consequence has 
not occurred because the failure never happened or because the failure did happen but was not 
nearly as severe as assumed. But when doing a quantitative risk analysis (for example LOPA or 
QRA), the frequency of the consequence is no longer selected by the team – but rather it is 
calculated from the probability of the event and the probability of failure of the safeguards. In 
this case, overstating the severity will result in overstating the risk. Selecting a realistic and most 
probable worst-case severity is now critical for a consistent risk ranking.  
Marathon Petroleum Company, LP (MPC) with support from ABSG Consulting has performed a 
generalized analysis for predicting H2S exposure and has developed guidance for use by risk 
assessment teams in estimating the probable worst-case severity for exposure in the case of leaks 
from process equipment containing H2S. The following sections detail the methodology and the 
assumptions that were used to develop the guidance and show the conclusions that were reached 
based on the analysis. 
  
2 Overview 
To develop generalized guidance for the severity of H2S leaks that is applicable for a wide range 
of process conditions, dispersion modeling was performed for liquid and vapor streams with a 
wide range of pressures and H2S concentrations. Process conditions were varied between model 
runs, while other dispersion model parameters used constant values, representing typical 
conditions. The modeling provided the H2S concentration in the air as a function of distance 
from the leak source for a variety of stream conditions. By selecting a representative distance, 
this function of distance is reduced to a single value thereby resulting in a direct correlation 
between stream conditions and H2S concentration in the breathing zone of a person (right side in 
Figure 2-1) 
A review of available toxicology data coupled with an assumption for the duration of the 
exposure linked the concentration of H2S in the breathing zone to health effects for an exposed 
person. These health effects were then classified according to the severity definitions per the 
company’s risk standard. This provided a correlation between exposure and the severity 
classification (left side in Figure 2-1). 
 
Figure 2-1. Correlating Dispersion Modeling and Toxicology 
Combining the dispersion modeling with the toxicology review then allows to directly correlate 
the stream conditions of the leak with the severity outcome. Figure 2-1 shows an overview of the 
methodology. Green text in Figure 2-1 indicates inputs to the analysis that were varied. Orange 
text indicates inputs for which representative values were selected and then kept constant. The 
steps shown in Figure 2-1 are discussed in detail in the following sections.  
3 H2S Release from Liquid Phase Leaks 
The H2S concentration in the vapor phase of a release depends on two factors: 
1. How much of the material vaporizes upon release; and 
2. How the H2S partitions into the vapor and liquid phases. 
 
In answering these questions, the released material was broken into categories: 
A. Hydrocarbons containing H2S; 
B. Sour Water (contains H2S); and 
C. Rich Amine (contains H2S). 
 
The fraction of a hydrocarbon that vaporizes upon release depends on several factors including 
its temperature, pressure, and bubble point. A stream’s bubble point pressure relative to 
atmospheric pressure seems to have the largest effect on how much will vaporize: cold crude 
may vaporize very little, while hot naphtha may vaporize almost entirely. 
Several streams around Crude Units, Hydroprocessing Units, FCCU, and Coking units were 
studied, specifically looking at streams that contain H2S. Hysys, using the Peng-Robinson 
Equation of state, was used for modeling the phase equilibrium. For many of these streams, 
about 45% of the hydrocarbon vaporized, to where it is a useful approximation. 
These same streams were studied to determine how the H2S partitioned. H2S is a vapor at 
standard conditions, so it was not surprising that about 98% of the H2S was vaporized, with 2% 
remaining in the liquid phase. As a simplification, it was assumed that 100% of the hydrocarbon 
stream’s H2S is vaporized, which only minimally increases the H2S concentration in the vapor 
phase as compared to a 98% vaporization rate. 
The same analysis was conducted for sour water. Under most circumstances, the only vapor 
generated by the release was H2S, and almost 100% of the H2S evolved. As a simplification, the 
PHA team should assume that 100% of the sour water stream’s H2S is vaporized and that the 
generated vapor is 100% H2S. 
This analysis was also conducted for rich amine. Rich amine binds much of the H2S, preventing 
much of it from vaporizing. In the event of a rich amine release, 3% of the amine vaporizes, with 
35% of the H2S vaporizing. 
The hydrocarbon results were used as the basis for the dispersion modeling. The lower H2S 
release from amine was not considered during the remaining modeling. This can result in 
overstating the severity of rich amine leaks, which was accepted for the sake of simplicity. 
4 Dispersion Modeling 
Dispersion modeling was performed to determine the H2S concentrations to which a person may 
be exposed. The modeling was performed using PHAST (1) software along with spreadsheets 
and the data manipulation and extraction was performed using FACET3D (2) software.  
In the analysis some parameters were fixed constants for all cases and some were variable to 
capture the range of conditions seen in the field. The below parameters were held constant for all 
cases in PHAST. 
 5 mph wind speed 
 D stability level 
 68 °F ambient temperature 
 70% relative humidity 
 500 W/m2 thermal flux 
 1 m surface roughness 
 Horizontal (non-impinged) release direction 
 3.28 ft release height 
 100 °F stream temperature for vapor cases 
 200 °F flashed vapor temperature for liquid cases 
 Instantaneous (Flammable = 18.75 sec) averaging time used when determining 
downwind concentrations 
Parameters which were varied included the stream phase (liquid or vapor), H2S concentration in 
the stream, leak size, and pressure as shown below. 
 Stream phase: liquid or vapor; liquid streams used N-Hexane and H2S while the vapor 
streams used Ethane and H2S 
 H2S concentration in the stream: 25, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, and 50000 
ppm 
 Leak size: small leaks (0.5 inch) and large leaks (2 inch) 
 Pressure: low (100 psig), medium (300 psig) and high (500 psig) 
Vapor Releases 
Vapor releases were straightforward and did not require any post processing other than 
extracting the H2S concentration. Mixtures of H2S and Ethane were used in PHAST Vessel or 
Pipe Source models with the leak scenario type. The PHAST case list feature was used to build 
cases with varying parameters. The H2S component was tracked explicitly. Results of the 
dispersion were imported into FACET3D and a script was used to extract the centerline 
concentration at 3 ft downrange of the release. An example of the H2S cloud and the extracted 
centerline concentration is shown below in Figure 4-1. 
A distance of 3 ft from the leak was selected to represent the location of a person working on the 
equipment where the leak occurs (approximately an arm’s length plus a wrench’s length away). 
Personnel not working on the equipment, but just passing through the area would likely have a 
greater distance and thus lower exposure. 
Liquid Releases 
The expected H2S evolution from liquid releases was described above in Section 4. Using those 
rules, the liquid release modeling in PHAST had the following approach. 
1. Determine the liquid discharge rate for the given pressure and leak size. 
a. An artificially low temperature of 100° F was used such that no flashing occurred 
in the orifice, maximizing the liquid discharge rate. 
b. The releases used the same PHAST source models as the vapor cases but with 
mixtures of H2S and N-Hexane. 
2. Assume 45% of the hydrocarbon discharge mass turns to vapor and 100% of the H2S 
discharge mass turns to vapor. 
3. Create a user defined release in PHAST of just the flashed hydrocarbon and H2S vapor. 
Use the same discharge expanded velocity as the liquid release. Use an expanded 
temperature of 200 °F (minimum to keep the N-Hexane a vapor for all cases). Use a new 
mixture of N-Hexane and H2S which accounts for the higher H2S percentage in the 
flashed vapor (since 100% of H2S flashed but only 45% of the hydrocarbon flashed). In 
general, this vapor mixture had 2.2 times the H2S ppm as the original case description. 
Therefore, the final liquid release was modeled as an equivalent vapor release of H2S and N-
Hexane which represented the flashed hydrocarbons. The dispersion modeling of the equivalent 
vapor release was performed in the same manner as the pure vapor releases.  
 
Figure 4-1. Vapor Release for 2” Leak and 500 psig with 500 ppm H2S in Stream 
Dispersion Results 
Because of the large discharge rates seen in the liquid cases, a larger volume of vapor (H2S + 
hydrocarbon) was released compared to the pure vapor cases. The liquid cases evolved 18% to 
42% more vapor depending on pressure. Further, due to the higher concentration of H2S in the 
flashed vapor from liquid cases (since only 45% of hydrocarbon flashed), the resulting H2S 
concentrations downrange were 21% - 44% higher than equivalent pure vapor cases depending 
on pressure (higher pressures gave higher H2S concentrations for liquid vs. vapor releases). 
A comparison of the exposed H2S concentration vs. the stream H2S concentration is shown 
below in Figure 4-2. The following observations are made: 
1. The exposed concentration can exceed the stream concentration for the liquid cases since 
the H2S evolves at a higher rate than the hydrocarbon. This is analogous to a distillation 
tower which produces a higher fraction of one mixture component at the top compared to 
the mixture entering the tower. 
2. The vapor releases show increasing exposure concentrations with stream pressure while 
the liquid releases do not. The vapor releases had H2S concentrations immediately 
downstream of the orifice (<1 ft) which were lower than the mixture H2S concentration. 
This effect was larger for lower discharge rate releases. The liquid releases more closely 
matched the mixture H2S concentration at all discharge rates immediately downstream of 
the orifice. It appears the high velocity vapor releases entrain more air which influences 
the initial downstream concentrations. 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Exposed vs. Stream H2S Concentration 
5 Health and Safety Effects of Exposure 
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) is a colorless, flammable gas with a strong, irritating rotten-egg odor. 
H2S is detectable by odor at concentrations significantly lower than those necessary to cause 
physical harm or impairment. The physiological effects of airborne toxic materials depend on the 
concentration of the toxic vapor in the air being inhaled, and the length of time an individual is 
exposed to this concentration. The most serious hazard presented by H2S is exposure to a large 
release from which escape is impacted.  
 
Occupational exposure to hydrogen sulfide is frequently encountered in various industries where 
H2S may be released to the environment as part of the manufacturing/ treatment process.  Some 
of these industries include natural gas production, municipal sewage pumping and treatment 
plants, landfilling, swine containment and manure handling, pulp and paper production, 
construction in wetlands, asphalt roofing, pelt processing, animal slaughter facilities, tanneries, 
petroleum refining, petrochemical synthesis, coke production plants, viscose rayon manufacture, 
sulfur production, iron smelting, and food processing. 
H2S and its metabolites are not long-lived in the tissues of exposed animals, indicating that 
longer-term exposures to low levels may not be as important as short-term peak events. H2S is 
not considered a cumulative toxin since it is rapidly oxidized to sulfate, which is readily excreted 
in urine. 
 
5.1 Animal data (short-term effects) 
Results from animal inhalation studies indicate that H2S is widely distributed in the body, 












35 (25)  Repeated,  
3 h/day 
Cumulative change in hippocampal type 1 EEG 
activity in rat 
42 (30) 14 (10) Once for  
3 hours 
Cytochrome oxidase inhibition in the lung 
≥ 70 (≥ 50) 14 (10) 4 h Inhibition of cytochrome oxidase in rat lung cells 
100 (72)  1.5 h/day 
several 
days 
Various cardiac arrhythmias including ventricular 
extrasystoles in rabbits and guinea pigs 
140 (100)  2 h, 4-day 
intervals,  
4 times 
Increasing inhibition of cerebral cytochrome 
oxidase activity and decreased protein synthesis 
in mouse brain 
140 (100)  3 h/day,  
5 days 
Increased level of L-glutamate in hippocampus of 
rats 
280 (200)  4 h Detectable histologic lesions in nasal epithelium 
of rats 
280 (200)  4 h Increase in protein and lactate dehydrogenase in 
lavage fluids from rat lung 
280-560 
(200-400) 
70 (50) 4 h Particle-induced oxygen consumption reduced in 
pulmonary alveolar macrophages from rats 
420 (300)  4 h Marked abnormality in surfactant activity in 
lavage fluids from rat lungs 
560 (400)  4 h Transient increase in protein concentration and 
activity of lactate dehydrogenase in nasal lavage 
fluids or rats 
615 (439)  4 h Transient necrosis and exfoliation of nasal 
respiratory and olfactory mucosal cells in rat. 
Reversible pulmonary edema 
Table 5-1: Summary of short-term non-lethal studies with H2S (4) 
  
5.2 Human data (short-term effects) 
Separation of effects in humans due to odor nuisance vs. physiological effects is often difficult. 











0.028 (0.02)  Minimum perception threshold 
0.18 (0.13)  Generally accepted smell threshold 
2.8 (2)  Non-significant effects in asthmatic subjects (exposure 
for 30 min) 
4.2-7 (3-5)  Offensive smell 
7 (5) 2.8 (2) Increased muscle lactate levels during exercise 
(exposure > 16 min) and increased oxygen uptake 
14 (10)  Exposure for 15 minutes did not alter the pulmonary 
function significantly. 
14 (10)  Reduced oxygen uptake during exercise (exposure two 
times 30 minutes) 
> 140 (>100)  No smell due to olfactory fatigue 
700-1400 
(500-1000) 
 Stimulation of carotid bodies 
1400-2800 
(1000-2000) 
 Paralysis of respiratory center and breathing stops 
Table 5 -2: Summary of short-term human studies with H2S (4) 
 
6 Severity Correlation 
The health effects of H2S exposure detailed in the previous section needs to be related to the 
severity definitions used in a company’s risk standard. For this paper, the severity definitions of 
“None” through “S4” shown in Table 6-1 were used.  
The health effects depend on the duration of the H2S exposure – longer exposure leads to more 
severe effects. For the purposes of the severity correlation, a maximum exposure time of five 
minutes was used. The value was selected based on the assumption that an exposed person would 
immediately be alerted to the exposure through their personal H2S monitor and quickly evacuate 
upwind or crosswind once the monitor alarms. Five minutes provides sufficient time for egress 
even from spaces with limited accessibility.  
Table 6-1 lists the severity categories and their definitions used in this paper, as well as the 
health effects from exposure that correspond to the severity definition and the H2S concentration 
that would cause these effects.  
Severity 
Category 
Health and Safety 
Impact Description 
Effects of up to 5 min 
H2S Exposure 
Range of H2S in 
breathing zone 
Very low / 
None  
No health and safety 
consequence –  
Up to Occupational 
Exposure Limit (OEL) 
0 – 10 ppm 
Low (S1) First aid case 
Up to Peak Exposure 
Limit (PEL); Below US 
EPA’s 10-min AEGL of 
76 ppm; Below AIHA’s 
1-hr ERPG-3 of 100 ppm 
> 10 ppm  




incident with no lost time 
or hospitalization 
Loss of smell, irritation 
of respiratory tract and 
eyes; Up to IADC’s  
300 ppm for 5 min 
survivability criteria 
> 50 ppm  
to 300 ppm 
High (S3) 
Injury resulting in lost 
time, hospitalization or 
permanent disability 
Difficulty breathing, 
serious eye damage and 
severe lung irritation 
> 300 ppm  





collapse, potentially fatal 
within minutes due to 
respiratory paralysis; 
Threshold of human 
lethal effect for 10 min 
exposure (SPEL) 
> 700 ppm  
Table 6 -1: Severity Categories 
It is important to keep in mind that this categorization is based on observed effects of exposure 
and represents a probable worst-case outcome – and not on the worst possible case or an 
exposure limit. The severity rating is for hazard evaluation purposes only and is not intended to 
indicate acceptable or safe levels of exposure. 
If a company defines the severity levels differently than presented here, the correlation with the 
health effects and the corresponding H2S concentration will need to be adjusted from what is 
listed in Table 6-1. 
  
7 Summarizing the Modeling Results 
Each severity category covers a range of H2S exposure concentrations. This makes it possible to 
generalize the results from the modeling because variations in some of the parameters will not 
cause a significant shift between categories. A sensitivity analysis can indicate which parameters 
have the most significant effect on the predicted H2S exposure and thus the Health and Safety 
consequences. 
Based on the modeling, it was found that the H2S concentration in the breathing zone mainly 
depends on the size of the leak; smaller leaks will result in a lower H2S concentration at 3 feet 
from the leak. Also, vapor releases result in lower H2S concentration in the breathing zone than 
liquid releases with the same H2S stream concentration, since the non-H2S components in the 
vapor release dilute the H2S concentration in the air. Dependence on pressure was found to be 
insignificant for liquid releases. 
As described in the previous sections, there are many parameters that can affect the analysis, 
many of which were assumed as constant. For guidance to a PHA team, the results of the 
analysis need to be simplified and summarized in terms of data that are most readily available to 
the team. These are generally the conditions of the process stream (available from the material 
balance for the unit) and the size of the leak. Of these parameters, the H2S concentration in the 
stream, the leak size (small or large) and the phase of the stream (vapor or liquid) have the most 
significant impact on the severity outcome.  
Combining the dispersion modeling results (Section 4) with the severity correlation for breathing 
air concentrations (Table 6-1) provides a correlation between the release conditions and the 
health and safety outcome. The following table summarizes the predicted severity outcome for a 
range of process conditions and leak sizes.  
 
Table 7-1: Severity Table based on H2S Concentration, Leak Size and Phase of Process Stream 
If desired, the guidance can be further simplified by using worst case assumption for the leak 
size and phase, resulting in a simple table that only requires the H2S concentration in the stream 
as input.  
  
H2S Concentration in the Stream Health and Safety Consequence Severity  
≤ 10 ppm No consequence None 
> 10 ppm and ≤ 50 ppm First aid case S1 
> 50 ppm and ≤ 250 ppm OSHA recordable S2 
> 250 ppm and ≤ 1000 ppm 
Injury with restricted duty, lost time 
or hospitalization 
S3 
> 1000 ppm  Fatality  S4 
Table 7-2: Simplified Severity Table Based Only on H2S Concentration in the Stream 
The simplified severity guidance given in Table 7-2 overstates the severities for small vapor 
leaks, but results in a simplified correlation for PHA teams that is easy to use. This table can be 
used as a starting point for the severity estimation. Teams may choose to use the more detailed 
Table 7-1 if they are concerned that the severity may be overstated or does not match what has 
been observed in the past, especially if the release comes from a small vapor leak.  
8 Conclusions 
It is not surprising that estimating the severity of the health and safety consequences of a 
potential H2S release is difficult for PHA teams. The analysis presented in this paper shows the 
numerous parameters, assumptions, modeling, and toxicity information that is required for this 
type of estimation. However, by making conservative, but reasonable assumptions for most of 
these parameters, a generalized correlation between H2S concentration in the process stream and 
the severity of the health and safety effects has been developed.  
The generalized correlation provides guidance to PHA teams that is easy to use because it is only 
based on information that is readily available to them. It helps drive consistency in the severity 
estimation. PHA teams are often “out of their depth” when estimating consequences and are 
generally appreciative of clear guidance. 
The development of the guidance tables shown in section 7 required multiple assumptions and is 
based on a specific risk matrix. The values in this table cannot be simply copied from one 
company to another but will need to be reviewed and adjusted to match each company’s risk 
standard. 
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